Hybrid warfare is characterized by energy aggression. Energy weapon can be used to achieve political goals. For example, the energy resource that Russia blackmailed Ukraine and the EU countries was natural gas. Russia's gas war against Ukraine and the EU began long before the start of full-scale military operations on the territory of Ukraine; its first manifestations were the gas crises in 2006 and 2009, when Russia interrupted the transit of natural gas through the territory of Ukraine. In fact, energy resources were used to punish those who tried to reduce Russian influence.
In the report of the EU Institute for Security, the events of 2006 and 2009 are called a “wake-up call,” thanks to which the issue of energy supply security has become extremely relevant in the political agenda of Europe.
The gas wars between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 were the last frontier in Russian-European relations, after which the EU abandoned the idea of an energy alliance with Russia.
On May 4, 2006, at a conference in Vilnius, the idea of “energy weapons” in the modern history of energy trade between Russia and the European Union was first announced at a high level. During the conference, Vice President of the United States, Dick Cheney, delivered a speech in which he made several allegations against Russia, including possible misuse of energy trade. He emphasized that legitimate interests could not be protected if oil and gas became a tool of intimidation or blackmail due to manipulation of supplies or attempts to monopolize transportation of energy resources. After the Vilnius Conference, the policy of containment against Gazprom intensified, as Gazprom began to be perceived as the Kremlin's energy weapon.
Consequently, energy weapons have become effective in the context of Ukraine and EU countries' dependence on gas supplies. During this period, two Russian-Ukrainian gas conflicts led to the interruption of Russian gas supplies to Europe. In 2014, the tense state of relations between Russia and Ukraine threatened to completely stop the transit of Russian gas to Europe through Ukrainian territory and the deepening of political differences between Russia and the EU on the Ukrainian issue — the termination of Russian gas supplies to EU countries.
During the global energy crisis of late 2021 and early 2022, energy weapon was again used by Russia against EU countries. In particular, since September 2021, the restriction of energy supplies from the Russian Federation to the EU has become an unfriendly political move. The artificial reduction of such supplies can be regarded as an energy special operation on the part of the Russian Federation. As a result, according to independent experts, the Russian Federation bears significant responsibility for the gas crisis in Europe in late 2021 – early 2022. At that time, Gazprom manipulated gas prices to speed up the approval of “Nord Stream-2.”
In addition, the energy crisis has slowed down the “green revolution” in Europe, which is unprofitable for Russia as the world's leading energy supplier and representative of traditional energy. All this provoked price wars and a fierce struggle of international actors for energy market shares. In fact, a global energy war has unfolded. In the future, due to large-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine, at the end of February 2022, the energy crisis threatening catastrophic consequences for the world economy began with a galloping increase in energy prices.
It is important to note that before the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in 2022, according to the EU, the share of Russian pipe gas in the European market was more than 44%. Despite its significant dependence on Russian gas, within a short time the European Union decided to take decisive steps aimed at significantly reducing its dependence on Russian energy resources. Thus, in the spring of 2022, the European Union made a strategic decision to completely abandon the consumption of Russian gas until 2027. As a result of the rapid actions of European countries to abandon Russian gas, Gazprom began to suffer significant financial losses, and in 2023 the company recorded a loss of $7 billion. At the same time, the company's production fell by 25%.
Today, many EU member states, as well as European supranational institutions, reasonably express concerns and accusations that Russia is capable of using energy supplies (mainly gas) as a political (energy) weapon.
In fact, at the end of 2021- in 2022, the Russian Federation, in the struggle with the United States for the future of “Nord Stream-2”, refused to increase the volume of gas transit to Europe through Ukraine. Russia used this situation as a lever of pressure to quickly obtain all the necessary permits and put into operation the “Nord Stream-2” gas pipeline, which connected Russia and Germany with the bottom of the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine. On October 4, 2021, Gazprom even started filling “Nord Stream-2” with gas. Gazprom believed that against the background of the global energy crisis and a record increase in energy prices, the situation for Gazprom was developing positively and was sure that there would be no opposition to “Nord Stream-2” in Europe (but in practice everything turned out quite differently).
In general, the events of 2006, 2009, and 2021-2022 led to the fact that dependence on imported (Russian) gas began to be perceived in Europe as a threat to energy security. However, in 2022, the problems in the energy sector of the EU countries that arose against the background of the Russian invasion of Ukraine are incomparably larger than the difficulties that arose in the EU's energy supply in 2006 and 2009, although neither in 2006 nor in 2009 there were drastic changes in European energy policy that would create conditions for real diversification of energy supplies to the EU in the future. The energy crises of 2006 and 2009 should be assessed as a basis for developing concrete measures to improve energy security in the political agenda of EU countries.
After all, in the EU Energy Union, Gazprom was called an unreliable partner. Due to Russia's desire to monopolize the European market, gas supplies were regularly threatened with disruption. However, low gas prices were too attractive for the European consumer to refuse to work closely with Kremlin-controlled Gazprom. Therefore, the attitude toward increasing gas supplies to the EU from Russia has long remained a compromise.
One of the main reasons for this decision was the policy of “greening” the energy sector of European countries. The transition to renewable energy requires reliable energy support: the coal industry in the EU did not develop due to environmental standards and CO2 quotas; the development of nuclear energy was blocked by lobbyists; gas production in Europe declined annually. Having deprived businesses of their own energy production, the governments of European countries are “hooked” on cheap Russian gas.
For more details on the struggle for dominance in energy markets between key players in the global energy sector, see Hybrid Warfare (History, Politics, and Security). This book is an important tool for understanding hybrid warfare. Its detailed analysis and implementation of the developed recommendations can really increase the effectiveness of countering hybrid threats. This publication is an important contribution to understanding the phenomenon of hybrid warfare and developing effective mechanisms to counter it. Its careful study and practical application can significantly increase the readiness of the state and society to the challenges of hybrid aggression.
In the report of the EU Institute for Security, the events of 2006 and 2009 are called a “wake-up call,” thanks to which the issue of energy supply security has become extremely relevant in the political agenda of Europe.
The gas wars between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 were the last frontier in Russian-European relations, after which the EU abandoned the idea of an energy alliance with Russia.
On May 4, 2006, at a conference in Vilnius, the idea of “energy weapons” in the modern history of energy trade between Russia and the European Union was first announced at a high level. During the conference, Vice President of the United States, Dick Cheney, delivered a speech in which he made several allegations against Russia, including possible misuse of energy trade. He emphasized that legitimate interests could not be protected if oil and gas became a tool of intimidation or blackmail due to manipulation of supplies or attempts to monopolize transportation of energy resources. After the Vilnius Conference, the policy of containment against Gazprom intensified, as Gazprom began to be perceived as the Kremlin's energy weapon.
Consequently, energy weapons have become effective in the context of Ukraine and EU countries' dependence on gas supplies. During this period, two Russian-Ukrainian gas conflicts led to the interruption of Russian gas supplies to Europe. In 2014, the tense state of relations between Russia and Ukraine threatened to completely stop the transit of Russian gas to Europe through Ukrainian territory and the deepening of political differences between Russia and the EU on the Ukrainian issue — the termination of Russian gas supplies to EU countries.
During the global energy crisis of late 2021 and early 2022, energy weapon was again used by Russia against EU countries. In particular, since September 2021, the restriction of energy supplies from the Russian Federation to the EU has become an unfriendly political move. The artificial reduction of such supplies can be regarded as an energy special operation on the part of the Russian Federation. As a result, according to independent experts, the Russian Federation bears significant responsibility for the gas crisis in Europe in late 2021 – early 2022. At that time, Gazprom manipulated gas prices to speed up the approval of “Nord Stream-2.”
In addition, the energy crisis has slowed down the “green revolution” in Europe, which is unprofitable for Russia as the world's leading energy supplier and representative of traditional energy. All this provoked price wars and a fierce struggle of international actors for energy market shares. In fact, a global energy war has unfolded. In the future, due to large-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine, at the end of February 2022, the energy crisis threatening catastrophic consequences for the world economy began with a galloping increase in energy prices.
It is important to note that before the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in 2022, according to the EU, the share of Russian pipe gas in the European market was more than 44%. Despite its significant dependence on Russian gas, within a short time the European Union decided to take decisive steps aimed at significantly reducing its dependence on Russian energy resources. Thus, in the spring of 2022, the European Union made a strategic decision to completely abandon the consumption of Russian gas until 2027. As a result of the rapid actions of European countries to abandon Russian gas, Gazprom began to suffer significant financial losses, and in 2023 the company recorded a loss of $7 billion. At the same time, the company's production fell by 25%.
Today, many EU member states, as well as European supranational institutions, reasonably express concerns and accusations that Russia is capable of using energy supplies (mainly gas) as a political (energy) weapon.
In fact, at the end of 2021- in 2022, the Russian Federation, in the struggle with the United States for the future of “Nord Stream-2”, refused to increase the volume of gas transit to Europe through Ukraine. Russia used this situation as a lever of pressure to quickly obtain all the necessary permits and put into operation the “Nord Stream-2” gas pipeline, which connected Russia and Germany with the bottom of the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine. On October 4, 2021, Gazprom even started filling “Nord Stream-2” with gas. Gazprom believed that against the background of the global energy crisis and a record increase in energy prices, the situation for Gazprom was developing positively and was sure that there would be no opposition to “Nord Stream-2” in Europe (but in practice everything turned out quite differently).
In general, the events of 2006, 2009, and 2021-2022 led to the fact that dependence on imported (Russian) gas began to be perceived in Europe as a threat to energy security. However, in 2022, the problems in the energy sector of the EU countries that arose against the background of the Russian invasion of Ukraine are incomparably larger than the difficulties that arose in the EU's energy supply in 2006 and 2009, although neither in 2006 nor in 2009 there were drastic changes in European energy policy that would create conditions for real diversification of energy supplies to the EU in the future. The energy crises of 2006 and 2009 should be assessed as a basis for developing concrete measures to improve energy security in the political agenda of EU countries.
After all, in the EU Energy Union, Gazprom was called an unreliable partner. Due to Russia's desire to monopolize the European market, gas supplies were regularly threatened with disruption. However, low gas prices were too attractive for the European consumer to refuse to work closely with Kremlin-controlled Gazprom. Therefore, the attitude toward increasing gas supplies to the EU from Russia has long remained a compromise.
One of the main reasons for this decision was the policy of “greening” the energy sector of European countries. The transition to renewable energy requires reliable energy support: the coal industry in the EU did not develop due to environmental standards and CO2 quotas; the development of nuclear energy was blocked by lobbyists; gas production in Europe declined annually. Having deprived businesses of their own energy production, the governments of European countries are “hooked” on cheap Russian gas.
For more details on the struggle for dominance in energy markets between key players in the global energy sector, see Hybrid Warfare (History, Politics, and Security). This book is an important tool for understanding hybrid warfare. Its detailed analysis and implementation of the developed recommendations can really increase the effectiveness of countering hybrid threats. This publication is an important contribution to understanding the phenomenon of hybrid warfare and developing effective mechanisms to counter it. Its careful study and practical application can significantly increase the readiness of the state and society to the challenges of hybrid aggression.